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FARMERS' PREPAID FEED DEDUCTIONS
Mann v. Commissioner,
483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973)
Taxpayer, a cash-basis' farmer, paid $21,000 for livestock feed dur-
ing the final days of his 1966 tax year. Although the vendor's order
form specified both price and quantity for each feed, the parties agreed
that taxpayer was bound by neither in the event market prices declined
or his animals required different feeds at the time of delivery.2 Tax-
payer deducted the entire payment as an "ordinary and necessary"
business expense on his 1966 tax return.3  The Commissioner disal-
lowed the deduction on the grounds that (1) the payment was a deposit
against future purchases rather than a binding sales contract and (2)
the payment was not an ordinary and necessary business expense for
1966.4 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner on both grounds.5
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held:
A cash-basis farmer may deduct the cost of prepaid feed in the year
of payment if the payment is made pursuant to a binding contract and
is not otherwise refundable. 6
1. See notes 7-13 infra and accompanying text.
2. Taxpayer ordered $20,731 worth of feeds on December 30, 1966, and paid for
them in full the following day, December 31. The parties agreed that taxpayer would
be charged the lower of either the contract prices or the prevailing market prices at the
time of each delivery and that he would receive his usual discounts, irrespective of the
price. In addition, taxpayer did not have to take delivery of the exact amounts of each
feed ordered and could substitute different feeds if the condition of his livestock so re-
quired. The vendor could not remember at trial whether he had sufficient stocks on
hand to fill the order when the contract was made. No deliveries were made until the
following year and, until delivery, the vendor bore all risks of loss. The parties made
no provision for a refund in the event taxpayer did not take delivery of all or part of
the feed ordered. Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673, 674-75 (8th Cir. 1973).
3. Id. at 675-76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) states:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business ....
4. Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 1973).
5. Russell Mann, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 843 (1972).
6. Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973). In addition, the court
held that, for a taxpayer to preserve his deduction, the feed must be an "ordinary and
necessary" requirement of his business, the cash-basis method of accounting must prop-
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Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a taxpayer's accounting
method7 determines the tax year in which he may deduct his business
expenses from gross income." Treasury Regulations" force most tax-
payers engaged in the production of goods for sale to file their returns
under an accrual method10 in order to allocate income and deductions
erly reflect his income, and the amount bought must not be so excessive as to require
capital expenditure treatment. Id. at 680-81; see notes 49-51 infra.
7. The function of accounting is to match an enterprise's expenses with the rev-
enues the expenses produce. Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4, Basic Con-
cepts of Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises
155, in 2 CCH APB AccouNTNG PRINCIPLES provides:
Expenses are the costs that are associated with the revenue of the period,
often directly but frequently indirectly through association with the period to
which the revenue has been assigned. Costs to be associated with future
revenue or otherwise to be associated with future accounting periods are de-
ferred to future periods as assets.
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a), 446(a), 451(a), 461(a). The two most
common accounting methods for filing tax returns are the cash-basis, or cash receipts
and disbursements, method, id. § 446(c) (1), and the accrual method, id. § 446(c) (2).
Under the cash-basis method, income and expenses are recorded in the year of receipt
or disbursement. See note 13 infra. Accrual accounting methods, on the other hand,
record income and expenses when the underlying obligations become fixed. See note
11 infra.
9. The Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to "prescribe all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code]." INT. REv. Con
OF 1954,- § 7805(a). This rule-making authority has been delegated *to the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue. Treas. Reg. § 301.7805-1 (1960).
10. Neither the Code nor the Regulations expressly requires taxpayers engaged in
the production of goods for sale to use an accrual method. The Code permits taxpayers
to choose their method of accounting from those permitted either by the Code or by
regulation so long as the method chosen "clearly reflect[s] income." INT. REv. CoDE
OF 1954, §§ 446(a)-(c). However, the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate may
require taxpayers to take inventories and may prescribe the methods to be used so that
the tax returns clearly reflect income. Id. § 471. The Regulations require taxpayers
who manufacture goods for sale to record their beginning and ending inventories each
tax year. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1958); id. § 1.471-11 (1973). Whether or not en-
gaged in the manufacture of goods for sale, taxpayers who use inventories must adopt
the accrual method unless the Commissioner specifically determines that some other ac-
counting method more clearly reflects income. Id. § 1.446-1(c) (2) (1957). See gen-
erally Hawkinson, Farm Expenses and General Accounting Principles, 22 TAX L. REv.
237 (1967). Hawkinson observes:
The theory of inventory accounting is that an inventory represents costs to
be deferred to later years. Therefore, cost of goods sold is computed by sub-
tracting costs to be deferred (closing inventory) from the total of costs defer-
red from earlier years (opening inventory) and costs incurred (for acquisition,
production or development) in the current year.
Id. at 239.
There is no single accrual method of accounting. When Treasury Regulations do not
require a specific method, several different methods may accurately reflect a taxpayer's
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between goods which have been sold and those which have not."
Since 1915, however, the Regulations have permitted farmers to file
their returns on the cash-basis method.12  This allows them to deduct
income. Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 F.2d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1966). For
accrual methods available to farmers, see note 12 infra.
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1957); id. § 1.451-1(a) (1957); id. § 1.461-
l(a)(2) (1957); see, e.g., Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184-
85 (1934) (emphasis original):
Keeping accounts and making returns on the accrual basis, as distinguished
from the cash basis, import that it is the right to receive and not the actual
receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in gross income. When
the right to receive an amount becomes fixed, the right accrues.
12. T.D. 2153, 17 TREAS. DEC. INT. REv. 101 (1915):
All gains, profits, and income derived from the sale. . . of farm products
.. . shall be included in the return of income for the year in which the prod-
ucts were actually marketed and sold; and all allowable deductions, including
the legitimate expenses incident to the production of that year or future years
may be claimed.. . although the products to which such expenses and deduc-
tions are incidental may not have been sold . . . during the year for which
the return is rendered.
The relevant language is now found in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a) (1958):
A farmer who operates a farm for profit is entitled to deduct from gross in-
come as necessary expenses all amounts actually expended in the carrying on
of the business of farming. . . . The purchase of feed and other costs con-
nected with raising livestock may be treated as expense deductions insofar as
such costs represent actual outlay ....
The historical reason for permitting farmers to file under the cash-basis method was
to simplify their bookkeeping requirements. At the time the 1915 Regulations were is-
sued, tax distortion was minimal under the tax rates in effect-i % on the first $20,000
net income and a marginal rate of 6% on incomes in excess of $500,000. Income Tax
Act of 1913, ch. 16, § H A, 38 Stat. 166. In addition to the tax manipulation possibil-
ities available to any cash-basis taxpayer, see notes 14 & 15 infra, the cash-basis farmer
reaps tax windfalls from the capital gains treatment of livestock sales. See INT. REv.
CoDE oF 1954, §§ 1231(a), (b)(3). This provision adopted the result in Albright v.
United States, 173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949). See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
32 (1951). See generally United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 106-08 & n.9 (1966);
Davenport, A Bountiful Tax Harvest, 48 TEXAs L. REv. 1 (1969).
On the other hand, there is nothing in either the Code or the Regulations which pre-
cludes a cash-basis farmer from capitalizing his feed costs. Sonnabend v. Commissioner,
377 F.2d 42, 43 (1st Cir. 1967). An accrual method farmer may choose between four
different inventory methods. The cost method, Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3 (1958), and the
lower of cost or market method, id. § 1.471-4 (1958), are available to all taxpayers.
The other two methods are the farm-price method, id. §§ 1.471-6(c), (d), (h) (1958),
and the unit-livestock-price method, id. §§ 1.471-6(c), (e)-(g) (1958). In addition to
these methods, farmers whose crops take longer than one year to mature may, with the
consent of the Commissioner, use the crop method. Id. § 1.61-4(c) (1972); id. § 1.471-
6(a) (1958). These methods are described in IRS PUB. No. 225, FARMERS TAX GUDE
21-22, 29 (1974). See generally Branscomb, The Cash Method as Applied in Agricul-
ture-A Reexamination, 25 TAX LAwYER 125, 135-38 (1970); Hawkinson, supra note
10, at 243-49,
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most production costs in the year of payment irrespective of when the
associated income is earned.13 As a result, farmers may manipulate
their taxable income by incurring expenses prematurely, 14 thus shifting
an equivalent increment of income to the subsequent year and postpon-
ing the tax on that increment.1 5 Although long aware of these tax ad-
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.446(c)(1)(i) (1957); id. § 1.451-1(a) (1957); § 1.461-
l(a)(1) (1957); see, e.g., Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940). Constructive re-
ceipt of income is governed by Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957).
14. Tax law is unclear as to when cash-basis taxpayers may deduct prepaid expenses
in the year of payment and when they may not. Because accrual method taxpayers may
deduct expenses only when they are due, only cash-basis taxpayers face such timing
problems. The Regulations recognize that businesses incur "overlapping deductions."
So long as the item does not "materially distort income," a taxpayer may include such
a deduction in the year of his consistent practice. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1 (a) (3)(i)
(1957). In any event, a cash-basis taxpayer may not be able to deduct the entire cost,
in the year of payment, of "an expenditure [which] results in the creation of an asset
having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of the taxable year."
Id. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1957). Compare Maple v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 1055 (9th
Cir. 1971) (allowing deduction for prepaid tree growing services), and Rev. Rul. 190,
1971-1 Cum. BULL. 70 (allowing deduction for prepaid state taxes), wilth Main &
McKenney Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
688 (1940) (disallowing full deduction for prepaid rent). See also Waldheim Realty
& Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957) (allowing prepaid insurance
premiums); Commissioner v. Boylston Mkt. Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942) (dis-
allowing prepaid insurance premiums), overruling Welch v. DeBlois, 94 F.2d 842 (1st
Cir. 1938); John D. Fackler, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), acquiesced in, 1939-1 CUM. BULL.
11, acquiescence withdrawn and nonacquiescence substituted, Rev, Rul. 643, 1968-2
Ctm. BULL. 76 (prepaid interest); Metropolitan Properties Corp., 24 B.T.A. 220 (1937)
(expenses of securing a loan). By statutory provision, certain expenditures may be de-
ducted in the year of actual payment rather than being amortized over the life of the
asset created, regardless of the taxpayer's method of accounting. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 174 (research and experimental expenditures); id. § 175 (soil and water con-
servation expenditures); id. § 180 (fertilizer expenditures); id. § 182 (land clearing ex-
penditures). See generally 2 1. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION §§ 12.24-
.26 (1967, Supp. 1974); Irwin, Prepayments by a Cash Basis Taxpayer, 15 U. So. CAL.
1963 TAx INsT. 547; Olincy, Prepaid Income and Expenses-Where Are We Going?,
19 U. So. CAL. 1967 TAx INST. 357.
15. The following tables depict the tax savings generated by accelerating a $10,000
deduction one year to offset the greater net income of the earlier year. The tax is com-
puted using the rates applicable to married individuals filing a joint return, INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1(a).
TABLE I
BEFORE ACCELERATION
Gross Net
Income Deductions Income Tax
Year 1 $150,000 100,000 50,000 17,060
Year 2 125,000 100,000 25,000 6,020
Total Tax $23,080
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vantages available to farmers, 6 Congress has not disturbed theml7 ex-
cept in two limited areas.' 8
TABLE I
AFTER ACCELERATION
Gross Net
Income Deductions Income Tax
Year 1 $150,000 110,000 40,000 12,140
Year 2 125,000 90,000 35,000 9,920
Total Tax $22,060
The taxpayer saves $1,020 over a two-year period. By accelerating similar deductions
in succeeding years, a taxpayer may postpone paying taxes on that increment of income
until he des. The policy of the Commissioner, however, is to accelerate tax payments
rather than postpone them. Cf. American Auto. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 367 U.S. 687
(1961).
16. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1969):
In general, where a significant factor in a business is the production or sale
of merchandise, the taxpayer must use an accrual method of accounting and
inventories. The effect of these accounting rules is to postpone the deduction
of the costs of the merchandise until the accounting period in which the in-
come from its sale is realized. These rules need not be followed, however,
with respect to income or deductions from farming. In other words, a cash
accounting method may be used for this purpose under which costs are de-
ducted as incurred. A taxpayer in the business of farming is also allowed to
deduct expenditures for developing a business asset which other taxpayers
would have to capitalize.
Both reports on the Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, 65 Stat. 501, evidenced a congres-
sional awareness of farm accounting methods. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
32 (1951); S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1951). Accordingly, the
Treasury Department has expressed doubt that it can administratively eliminate the tax
windfalls permitted farmers under its longstanding regulations. Letter from John W.
Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury, to Walter F. George, Chairman of the Committee
on Finance, United States Senate, in 5 CCH 1952 STAND. FED. TAX REP. f 6239. In
United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 115 n.23 (1966), the Supreme Court expressly
refused to resolve this question.
17. Congress has, in fact, permitted taxpayers "engaged in the business of farming"
to deduct certain expenditures in the year of payment without regard to the otherwise
proper year of deduction. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 175 (soil and water conserva-
tion); id. § 180 (fertilizer); id. § 182 (land clearing).
18. Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 216(a), INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 278, requires
farmers to capitalize their costs of planting and maintaining citrus groves during the first
four tax years following planting. These expenditures are comparable to those a farmer
incurs in feeding his livestock. This section was added to the Tax Reform Act as a
floor amendment in the Senate to aid Florida citrus growers who were concerned that
tax shelter promotions were stimulating overproduction. 115 CONG. REc. 37486-88
(1969) (remarks of Senator Holland). Almond groves were later added to this provi-
sion. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-680, § 1, 84 Stat. 2064, amending INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 278. The prior law, which still applies to other orchards, is discussed
in Maple v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1971), and Estate of Wilbur, 43
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As a result of the increased use of tax shelters in recent years,19 the
Commissioner has questioned the year-end purchase of livestock feed
to be used by the taxpayer in the next year.20 In order to preserve
his deduction, the taxpayer must qualify as a farmer21 and the feed
T.C. 322 (1964). See generally Lewis, Farm and Hobby Losses After Tax Reform, 23
U. So. CAl,. 1971 TAX INST. 627, 663-65.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 contained two other sections which limit use of some
of the tax advantages of farming by nonfarmers. Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 213(a),
211(a), INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, H9 183, 1251. Section 183 deals with "hobby losses"
in general. Section 1251 creates a recapture provision which applies only to taxpayers
whose nonfarm income exceeds $50,000 and whose farm losses exceed $25,000 in any
tax year. See also note 19 infra.
19. The effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on farming and tax shelters is dis-
cussed in Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1072-152 (1973); id., pt. 4, at 1503-31; Panel
Discussion on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt, 5, at 613-94 (1973). See also Davenport, supra note 12; Diamond
& Homes, Hobby Losses, 23 TAx LAWYER 609, 609-13 (1970); Griffith & Joy, What
the Act Does to the Farmer: Farm Parity or Class Discrimination?, 23 TAx LAWYER
495 (1970).
20. The Commissioner initially allowed taxpayers to deduct prepaid feed expenses
in the year of payment, "irrespective of the fact that it may not be consumed until the
following year." 4 P-H 1944 FED. TAXES 66,149 (Letter Ruling, Dec. 16, 1943). In
the last fifteen years, he has contested such expenses. Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d
673 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 843 (1972); Shippy v. United States,
308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962), aff'g 199 F. Supp. 842 (D.S.D. 1961); Cravens v. Com-
missioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959), rev'g 30 T.C. 903 (1958); Gaddis v. United
States, 330 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. Miss. 1971); Estate of Cohen, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1331 (1970); Tim W. Lillie, 45 T.C. 54 (1965), affd per curiam, 370 F.2d 562 (9th
Cir. 1966); John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181 (1959), acquiesced in, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 4. See
generally Pinney & Olsen, Farmer's Prepaid Feed Expenses, 25 TAx LAWYER 536
(1972).
Because accrual method taxpayers may not deduct a prepaid expense until payment
is due, litigation over such deductions is rare. See, e.g., Gold-Pak Meat Co., 40 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 357, 364 (1971). See also note 11 supra and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Hi-Plains Enterprises v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 520 (10th Cir.
1974); United States v. Chemell, 243 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1957). Treasury Regulations
define "farm" and "farmer" as follows:
As used in this section, the term "farm" embraces the farm in the ordinary
accepted sense, and includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, and track farms; also
plantations, ranches, and all land used for farming operations. All individuals,
partnerships, or corporations that cultivate, operate, or manage farms for gain
or profit, either as owners or tenants, are designated as farmers.
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4(d) (1957). See also id. H9 1.175-3, -4 (1957); id. § 1.182-2
(1965).
Both a dentist, Tim W. Lillie, 45 T.C. 54, 58-59 (1965), and an Irish Sweepstakes
winner, Estate of Cohen, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1331, 1338-40 (1970), have qualified
as farmers. The Code contains several provisions which apply only to taxpayers "en-
gaged in the business of farming." See note 18 supra.
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must be an ordinary and necessary expense for his farm.2" Some
courts have also required that the prepayment produce some special
benefit to the taxpayer,23 that it not be recoverable by the taxpayer,
24
or that it not include payment for services to be rendered in the
future." The existence of a special benefit resulting from the prepay-
ment was the crucial factor in the early cases. 6  In determining
whether the taxpayer benefited, the courts focused on whether the
vendor conditioned his sale on prepayment 27 or whether the prepay-
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a). Justice Cardozo distinguished "ordinary"
and "necessary" in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933):
We may assume that the payments ... were necessary for the development
of the petitioner's business, at least in the sense they were appropriate and
helpful. . . . But the problem is not solved when the payments are character-
ized as necessary. Many necessary payments are charges on capital ...
Now, what is ordinary, though there must always be a strain of constancy
within it, is none the less a variable affected by the time and place and circum-
stances. Ordinary in this context does not mean that the payment must be
habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them
often. . . . [A]n expense is an ordinary one because we know from experi-
ence that payments for such purpose. .. are. . . common and accepted. ....
23. Compare Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895, 899 (10th Cir. 1959), with
Shippy v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 842, 843 (D.S.D. 1961), aff'd on other grounds,
308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962). See also Tim W. Lillie, 45 T.C. 54, 62 (1965) (alterna-
tive holding).
24. Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743, 746-47 (8th Cir. 1962); Gaddis v.
United States, 330 F. Supp. 741, 750-51 (S.D. Miss. 1971); Tim W. Lillie, 45 T.C. 54,
62-63 (1965); John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181, 185-86 (1959).
25. Estate of Cohen, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1331, 1339-40 (1970); Tim W. Lillie,
45 T.C. 54, 62 (1965) (alternative holding). Courts have also considered whether the
prepayment distorted income, Shippy v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 842, 843 (D.S.D.
1961), aII'd on other grounds, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962), or constituted a capital
investment, Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895, 899 (10th Cir. 1959), in addition
to determining the taxpayer's consistent practice when buying feed, Shippy v. United
States, 308 F.2d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1962); John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181, 186 (1959).
26. Russell Mann, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mene. 843, 847 (1972):
Generally, the factor which distinguishes the cases allowing the deduction from
those which disallow it is the existence of some benefit to the taxpayer's busi-
ness which was acquired by the prepayment.
In its first consideration of prepaid feed deductions, however, the Tax Court focused
on whether the taxpayer could recover his payment. See R.D. Cravens, 30 T.C. 903,
907-08 (1958). The appellate court reversed the Tax Court in Cravens because it
thought that the special benefit acquired by the prepayment, a preference during a
drought, presented a "stronger" case for allowing the deduction than had the facts in
John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181 (1959). Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895, 899 (10th
Cir. 1959). Compare Shippy v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 842, 843 (D.S.D. 1961),
aft'd on other grounds, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962), with Cravens v. Commissioner,
272 F.2d 895, 899 (10th Cir. 1959).
27. Several courts have stated in dicta that the taxpayer could deduct the payment
in the year paid if the vendor refused to sell the feed unless the taxpayer prepaid.
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ment resulted in preferential treatment of the taxpayer.2 8
In recent cases, the decisive issue has been whether the taxpayer can
recover his payment.29 The Commissioner has argued that the
taxpayer incurs no current expense so long as he can recover the pay-
ment.80 A payment is recoverable either when it is not made pursuant
to a binding contract or when the contract permits a refund.31 The
validity of the contract is a question of state law.32  When the contract
Shippy v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 842, 843 (D.S.D. 1961), af!'d on other grounds,
308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962); Tim W. Lillie, 45 T.C. 54, 57, 62 (1965). No vendor,
however, has imposed such a condition in any of the reported cases.
28. Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959). The taxpayer in
Cravens was faced with the possibility of selling off his herd during a drought if he
was unable to secure a source of feed. A feed shortage need not actually occur for a
taxpayer to preserve his deduction, so long as he relies on predictions made by reputable
publications. Gaddis v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 741, 750 (S.D. Miss. 1971).
29. Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973); Gaddis v. United States,
330 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. Miss. 1971); Estate of Cohen, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1331
(1970); Tim W. Lillie, 45 T.C. 54 (1965). See also note 26 supra.
In Gaddis, the court found that the taxpayer believed he was bound by his contract.
After guessing incorrectly that feed prices would increase, he paid $21,000 above the
market prices at the time the feed was delivered. 330 F. Supp. at 749-50. Although
there was no mention of a refund in his contracts, the taxpayer in Lillie actually re-
ceived one refund. On the basis of that refund, the court found that there was a pos-
sibility of a refund on each of his other feed contracts. 45 T.C. at 62-63.
The possibility of a refund, however, is not necessarily fatal to the taxpayer's claim.
In Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959), the taxpayer contracted
to buy a specific quantity of feed at market prices at the time of delivery. He was en-
titled to a refund of any overpayment in the event his advance payment exceeded the
ultimate cost of the feed. Even though the size of the refund could not be determined,
the full amount of the prepayment was deductible.
30. If the taxpayer is not obligated to take delivery of the feed, he has not, at the
time of payment, incurred an expense in carrying on his trade or business. He may
receive a refund, in which case he has incurred no expense. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 162(a). He may also apply the prepayment towards a personal expense, which is not
deductible. Id. § 262. When the taxpayer has dealt amicably with the vendor for sev-
eral years, the parties may have an unwritten understanding that the prepayment will
be eventually exhausted even though it is not refundable. See Russell Mann, 41 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 843, 846 (1972).
31. The payment is also recoverable in the event the farmer sells the feed to a third
party. One court has held that if the farmer is a corporation selling its assets pursuant
to a plan of complete liquidation, it may not take a deduction for its feed payments
during the year of liquidation and at the same time qualify for nonrecognized gains
treatment under INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 337. Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d
195 (9th Cir. 1970).
32. See, e.g., Jefferson Mills, Inc. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 305, 313 (N.D.
Ga. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 367 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1966). Compare Mann v. Com-
missioner, 483 F.2d 673, 678 (8th Cir. 1973), with Shippy v. United States, 199 F.
Supp. 842, 844 (D.S.D. 1961), aff'd on other grounds, 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962).
See also 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON § 61.06, at n.73 (1970).
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is silent as to refundability, courts have considered the subsequent
actions of both parties3 and the vendor's treatment of the transaction
as indicative of the intent of the parties."
The Eighth Circuit previously considered prepaid feed deductions in
Shippy v. United States. 5 The vendor in Shippy treated the transac-
tion as a deposit against which he charged deliveries to the taxpayer.
At the time of payment, the parties made no agreement on either price
or quantity.3 6 Relying heavily on the vendor's testimony, the court
characterized the payment as a refundable deposit 37 without determin-
ing whether there was a contract.3
Although the agreement between vendor and taxpayer in Mann v.
Commissioner was similar to that in Shippy, the court analyzed the prob-
lem differently. 9 It initially rejected a new position taken by the Com-
missioner that deductibility depended on passage of title.40  In resolving
33. See, e.g., Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673, 678-79 (8th Cir. 1973);
Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1959); Tim W. Lillie, 45 T.C.
54, 56-57, 63 (1965).
34. See, e.g., Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743, 744-45, 746-47 (8th Cir. 1962).
But see John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181, 186 (1959):
We need not go into the question of whether or not the payments here in-
volved constituted income to the grain dealer in the years when they were re-
ceived. . . The manner in which the grain dealer treated these payments
taxwise is not relevant to a determination of petitioners' tax liability.
35. 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962).
36. Id. at 745-46.
37. The vendor testified at trial that the payment was a "deposit" which he would
have refunded to the taxpayer. Id. at 744-45, 746-47. The court of appeals ignored,
however, the vendor's testimony that such a refund would have been limited to the situa-
tion where the taxpayer "'had to sell his cattle and had no need for the grain . ... '
Id. at 747. A limited possibility of a refund need not be fatal to the taxpayer's claim.
See note 29 supra.
38. 308 F.2d at 746-47. The taxpayer contended that, although the agreement with
the vendor was a " 'contract to sell future goods,'" it was nevertheless an enforceable
contract. Id. at 746. The court of appeals characterized the transaction as "more in
the nature of an offer than a contract," but did not decide the issue. It held the exist-
ence of a contract to be a question of fact and found that there was ample evidence
to support the district court's findings. Id. at 746-47.
39. The court found that there were sufficient "factual distinctions" between Mann
and Shippy. 483 F.2d at 681. In both cases, however, the vendor treated the transac-
tion as a deposit on his books and the taxpayer was not required to take delivery of
a specific quantity of feed. Compare Mann v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 673, 675 (8th
Cir. 1973), with Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1962).
40. The Commissioner argued that the feed must be "in existence at the date of
purchase" for the deduction to be allowed. This argument was initially proposed by the
IRS Los Angeles District Director in News & Notes for the Tax Practitioner (Number
72-1), cited in Pinney & Olsen, supra note 20, at 545-46. The argument is premised
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the question of recoverability, the court emphasized the Tax Court's
characterization of the payment as a "nonrefundable deposit ' 41 and
stated that a "nonrefundable deposit is, quite simply, a payment" which
is made for "expenses incident 'to carrying on a trade or business.' "42
The court then limited its analysis of recoverability to determining
whether there was a contract under the Iowa Statute of Frauds.48 It
found that when either party has partially performed, either may enforce
an otherwise unenforceable contract.44 Therefore, either party could en-
force the contract because taxpayer had fully performed his obligation.
On UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105(2): "Goods must be both existing and identi-
fied before any interest in them can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identi-
fied are 'future' goods." The court found that none of the prior cases had relied on
the present existence of the feed and that in John Ernst, 32 T.C. 181, 185 (1959), the
Tax Court had expressly noted that the vendor did not have the feed on hand. In addi-
tion, the court found that the Internal Revenue Code does not premise deductibility "on
the passage of 'title."' 483 F.2d at 677.
41. Russell Mann, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 843, 846 (1972).
Even if petitioner's transfer . . . were irrevocable, we fail to see how this fact
altered the substance of the transaction. Petitioner merely made a nonrefund-
able deposit, which is nevertheless a deposit and not a purchase of specific
goods.
42. 483 F.2d at 678.
43. IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.2201(1) (1967).' Under this section, a contract for the
sale of goods for more than five hundred dollars is not enforceable unless (1) there is
a writing, (2) signed by the party to be charged, which (3) specifies a quantity. See
also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comment 1.
44. 483 F.2d at 678-79. The court was interpreting IowA CODE ANN. § 554.2201
(3)(c):
A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but
which is valid in other respects is enforceable . with respect to goods for
which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and
accepted ....
45. The Tax Court believed that only the taxpayer, who had fully performed, could
employ this exception to the Statute of Frauds, see notes 43 & 44 supra, to force delivery
of the feeds, and that the vendor could not have forced taxpayer to accept delivery,
Russell Mann, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 843, 846 (1972). If, however, this interpretation
is combined with the court's earlier characterization of the payment as a "nonrefundable
deposit," see note 41 supra, the taxpayer would risk losing his $21,000 payment if he
did not accept delivery. The Tax Court conjectured that the vendor would allow tax-
payer to charge other purchases against the payment. 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 846;
see note 30 supra.
The court of appeals followed the majority view that the exception to the Statute of
Frauds is available to either party. See Augustin Bros. v. Wright Grain Co., 460 F.2d'
376 (8th Cir. 1972); Lake Village Implement Co. v. Cox, 252 Ark. 206, 478 S.W.2d
36 (1972); Bridgewater Washed Sand & Stone Co. v. Bridgewater Materials, Inc.,
- Mass. -, 282 N.E.2d 912 (1972); Cohn v. Fisher, 118 N.J. Super. 286, 287 A.2d
222 (L. Div. 1972). Contra, In re Flying W Airways, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa.
1972). The court's interpretation assumes-that the payment constituted the price of the
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The court ignored the fact that the quantity of each feed was not fixed
by contract.
Observing that agricultural prices have risen sharply in recent
years,46 the court found that the taxpayer received two business bene-
fits from the transaction: (1) the price guaranty protected him from
further price increases, 47 and (2) he had the right to insist upon
delivery of the feed in the event of a feed shortage.4 The Commis-
sioner would have had to demonstrate at least one of the following to
deny the deduction successfully: (1) livestock feed was not an "ordi-
nary and necessary" business expense for taxpayer;49 (2) the cash-
basis accounting method did not properly reflect taxpayer's income; 0
goods and follows the Official Comment to the section. UNIF RM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-201, Comment 2: "Receipt and acceptance either of goods or of the price constitutes
an unambiguous overt admission by both parties that a contract actually exists."
There have been no reported Iowa decisions which interpret this section of the UCC,
but Mann is in accord with Iowa cases decided under prior law. See, e.g., King y.
Farmer's Grain Co., 194 Iowa 979, 188 N.W. 720 (1922); Peake v. Conlan, 43 Iowa
297 (1876). See generally Squillante, Sales Law in Iowa Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code-Article 2, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 59-65 (1970).
46. 483 F.2d at 680. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for-
merly published time series charts depicting the movement of agricultural prices relative
to those of industrial commodities. Compare National Summary of Business Condi-
tions, 59 FED. REs. BULL. 381, 382 (1973), with National Summary of Business Con-
ditions, 54 FED. REs. BUtLL. 455, 456 (1968).
47. 483 F.2d at 679. The Tax Court had emphasized that the prepayment had not
in fact protected taxpayer against a rise in market prices above the contract prices. On
two occasions, the vendor charged taxpayer prices in excess of the agreed prices. Tax-
payer had not, therefore, received the claimed benefit. Russell Mann, 41 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 843, 847 (1972). The court of appeals dismissed these overcharges, which totaled
$4 on a $21,000 transaction, as a "trivial variation." 483 F.2d at 679.
48. Id. at 679-80; see note 28 supra. The court refused to decide whether the tim-
ing of the prepayment must provide some business benefit in addition to that provided
by the purchase itself. So long as the expense was otherwise deductible, the court held
that the tax savings motives of the taxpayer were not relevant. 483 F.2d at 680. See
also Shippy v. United States, 308 F.2d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1962); Cravens v. Commis-
sioner, 272 F.2d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1959). But tax savings must not provide the only
business benefit in the transaction. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70
(1935).
49. 483 F.2d at 680; see INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 162(a). The benefits of pre-
payment found by the court will generally be applicable to all farmers; thus this limita-
tion should not pose any difficulty to a taxpayer who qualifies as a farmer. See note
21 supra.
50. 483 F.2d at 680; see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 446(a)-(c). Given the nearly
sixty years of Treasury Department acquiescence in the use of the cash-basis method
by farmers, the Commissioner might find a change in policy difficult to defend, both
in the courts and in Congress,
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(3) taxpayer had bought so much feed that his purchases required
capital expenditure treatment;5 1 or (4) taxpayer could recover his
payment.5
The decision in Mann substantially eases a farmer-taxpayer's burden
in preserving a deduction for prepaid feed. When planning similar
transactions, a farmer may anticipate all of the court's requirements
except the appropriateness of the cash-basis accounting method. Since
the cash-basis method is appropriate for farmers, the court reached the
correct result. However, it should be noted that this result permits a
farmer-taxpayer to distort his income for a given year. In contrast, the
tax laws require other taxpayers to use the accounting method that
clearly reflects their income. 5  Whether farmers should be subjected
51. 483 F.2d at 680-81; see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 263(a). The court found
the taxpayer's estimate of his needs to be reasonably accurate and did not object to the
length of time, one year, for which he was buying feed. 483 F.2d at 680. Compare
Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895, 897 (10th Cir. 1959) (prepayment not ex-
hausted for more than twenty-two months allowed), with Shippy v. United States, 308
F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1962) (prepayment to meet taxpayer's needs for seven months
disallowed).
52. 483 F.2d at 681; see notes 41-45 supra and accompanying text.
53. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 446(b):
[I]f the method used [by the taxpayer] does not clearly reflect income, the
computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the
opinion of the Secretary or his delegate, does clearly reflect income.
In Security Flour Mills v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1944), the Court held
that this languge
was not intended to upset the well-understood and consistently applied doctrine
that cash receipts or matured accounts due on the one hand, and cash pay-
ments or accrued definite obligations on the other, should not be taken out of
the annual accounting system and, for the benefit of the Government or the
taxpayer, treated on a basis which is neither a cash basis nor an accrual basis,
because so to do would, in a given instance, work a supposedly more equitable
result to the Government or to the taxpayer.
Following the decision in Mann, the Commissioner attempted to specify the situations
when he would not contest the deduction of prepaid livestock feed expenses:
First, the expenditure must be a payment for the purchase of feed rather than
a mere deposit; second, the prepayment must be made for a business purpose
and not merely for tax avoidance; and third, the deduction of such costs in
the taxable year of prepayment must not result in a material distortion of in-
come.
Technical Information Release No. 1261, in 7 CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP. % 6951
(emphasis original). Publication of these criteria as Revenue Ruling 73-530 was pre-
vented by a suit brought by tax shelter promoters on the grounds that the third criterion,
the income distortion test, was contrary to existing Treasury Regulations. Cattle Feed-
ers Tax. Comm. v. Schultz, CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAx CAS. (74-1,
at 83,067) f 9121 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 6, 1973), rev'd, id. % 9732 (10th Cir. Oct. 4, 1974),
But see Treas. Reg. §§ 1.461-1(a) (1), (3) (i) (1957).
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to the same accounting methods as other taxpayers is not answered in
Mann. That is a question of balancing the nation's farm and tax
policies."
54. It would appear that farmers find the advantages of the cash-basis method to
be significant. One participant in the 1973 congressional hearings on tax reform stated
that "over 97 percent of those filing returns reporting farm income and losses [in 1968]
used the cash basis." Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1074 (1973). Given this decided pref-
erence for the cash-basis method, it would appear that any change in farm tax account-
ing methods would require the acquiescence of farmers.
While such a drastic shift in accounting preference may not seem likely, the following
scenario suggests how it may occur. Large numbers of non-farmers qualify as farmers
for tax purposes. Because their incentive to produce farm products arises from the tax
benefits, these "tax farmers" are relatively indifferent to the prices they receive for their
products. See generally Davenport, supra note 12. So long as farm prices are high,
traditional farmers have no strong objections to tax farmers. But if farm prices become
depressed, traditional farmers may perceive tax farmers as the cause and believe it to
be in their interest to force all farmers to adopt accrual accounting methods to preclude
tax manipulation. See notes 10-15 supra and accompanying text. Citrus growers have
found it to their advantage to restrict the use of cash-basis accounting in their segment
of agriculture. See note 17 supra.
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